CLOSET TRACKERS, ALSO KNOWN AS CLOSET INDEXING OR INDEX HUGGING, REFERS TO THE PRACTICE OF FUND MANAGERS CLAIMING TO MANAGE PORTFOLIOS ACTIVELY WHEN IN REALITY THE FUND STAYS CLOSE TO A BENCHMARK
IMPACT OF CLOSET TRACKERS
The issues around โcloset trackersโ form part of a broader issue on the effectiveness of investor disclosure and the legitimate expectations of investors in respect of the service provided by some asset managers.
Closet trackers may result in:
- Investors making investment decisions based on an expectation that they will be provided with a more active fund management service than they receive in practice and, therefore, may be paying higher management fees than that usually envisaged for a passive/not significantly active management service;
- Investors being exposed to a different risk/return profile than they expect; and
Asset managers not providing clear descriptions of how funds are managed in key disclosure documents such as the fundโs Prospectus and Key - Investor Information Document (KIID).
The practice is now the focus of regulatory scrutiny and a clamp-down across Europe. ESMA is concerned the practice may harm investors as they are not receiving the service or risk/return profile they expect based on the fundโs disclosure documents, while potentially paying higher fees compared to those typically charged for passive management.
BACKGROUND
In 2016, ESMA conducted research on a sample of 2,600 funds for the period 2012-2014 to determine whether it could find any indication of closet indexing at an EU-wide level. Quantitative metrics, such as the percentage of a UCITSโ portfolio that does not coincide with the underlying equity benchmark, indicated between 5 and 15% of UCITS equity funds could potentially be closet indexers.
ESMA then reviewed the investor disclosure documents of the funds concerned, to see how they described their management strategy, and found they tended to confirm the quantitative analysis results.
Following ESMAโs analysis resulting in a statement on โsupervisory work on potential closet index trackingโ, a number of European regulators have investigated the โcloset trackerโ issue with varying results and subsequent measures taken.
Finanstilsynet, the Norwegian regulator, found that DNB Asset Management Fund had performed very closely to its benchmark, however, marketed and priced itself as an actively managed fund. In 2019, on appeal DNB Asset management was ordered to pay compensation of โฌ35 million.
The United Kingdom conducted an initial analysis and found that 5 of 23 investment funds presented as active funds displayed profiles of closet trackers. More recently, in March 2018, following the FCAโs investigation into closet trackers, it announced that ยฃ34 million in compensation payments was to be made to investors. Furthermore, the FCA new assessment of value rules require managers to assess whether value of money has been provided to fund investors (New COLL 6.6.20).
Conversely, some regulators following ESMAโs research and using additional measures (outlined further in Country Methodologies and Results section), did not identify the same issues in their markets, such as the AMF in France or the CSSF in Luxembourg. Albeit, they did acknowledge
improvements were required in investor disclosures. Although BaFin did identify some funds which closely tracked an index, it did not identify any cases in which a fund was purportedly active, had corresponding fees and nonetheless solely tracked an index. Furthermore, BaFiN stated that they are unpersuaded that it was its job as regulator to influence the level of fees charged by German funds or intervene in the economic decisions of the regulated funds.
MEASURES OF โCLOSET TRACKINGโ
There are a number of metrics used in the methodology to identify potential closet trackers. The most frequently referenced include:
- Active Share;
- Tracking Error Volatility;
- R2 (r-squared) and
- Style Shifting Activity (SSA).
While the Active Share shows the percentage of the portfolio that does not coincide with the underlying equity benchmark, the Tracking Error Volatility shows the volatility of the difference between the return of the portfolio and the return of its benchmark. Seen in conjunction, and in relation to a given equity index, low active share and low tracking error indicate that the portfolio of a fund is close to that of the respective index, which could be a sign for passive fund management.
The R2 ratio represents the percentage of a fund performance that can be explained by a change of performance in a benchmark index. The higher the R2, the closer the performance of the fund is correlated to that of the benchmark.
The style-shifting activity (SSA) developed by Herrmann, Rohleder, and Scholz (2016) seeks to capture shifts in management styles by measuring changes in fund exposures to various market factors between two quarters.
Following ESMAโs quantitative study, many European regulators have investigated closet tracking with varying results โ see country specific methodologies and results section for more detail.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
The following are summaries of key developments across a number of jurisdictions, including examples of inadequate investor disclosures, weak controls by management company boards and examples of overcharging and compensation:
COUNTRY METHODOLOGIES AND RESULTS
ESMA conducted a quantitative study to identify potentially closet index funds among European equity funds using the Cremers and Petajisto method
Following ESMAโs quantitative study, many European regulators have investigated closet tracking with varying results outlined below.