FCA Assessment of Value Part 5: The US approach – what can be learned

Little guidance on how the analysis should be prepared was provided until the requirements came before the US courts.

“To be guilty of a violation of § 36(b), … the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.” – Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt.

6 principles, known as the ‘Gartenberg Principles’ were established from the Gartenberg vs Merrill Lynch Asset Management court case in 1982.

These principles, similar to the FCA’s Assessment of Value seven ( 7 ) criteria, provide six factors to be considered to establish fair value and whether the fiduciary duty under Section 36 has been breached:

From the above it is clear to see that the FCA has built on the Gartenberg principles, which are based on US case law to identify ‘excessive fees’, to define the AoV framework here in the UK. Although there are distinct differences between the US and the UK models, both the US and UK have a list of factors that must be considered when assessing value, both requirements tend to address quality of service, performance, level of charges and economies of scale. Although the initial Gartenberg principles did not include comparable market rates, further case law has introduced the factor into US practice as outlined below.

In contrast to the Gartenberg principles, the FCA’s initial “Value for Money” rules were considered too focused on the AFMs’ costs rather than the full value proposition of funds. Taking this on board, the FCA redrafted the rules to encompass a wider interpretation of value – the final “FCA Assessment of Value” rule is closer to the Gartenberg principles.

In the U.S., the Gartenberg test had been largely unchallenged for over twenty-five years, and had been utilized by courts, the SEC, mutual fund boards, and investment advisers in analysing an adviser’s fiduciary obligations under Section 36(b). This however changed when Gartenberg was initially rejected in Jones v Harris Associates.

In Jones v Harris Associates, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Section 36(b) did not permit judicial regulation of mutual fund management fees. It acknowledged that management had a fiduciary duty to investors, but that did not imply judicial regulation of management fees was appropriate. Rather, the court stated that market forces were best able to determine the appropriateness of fees. The court provided that so long as the fee is adequately disclosed and no deception is involved, the directors’ decision as to whether the adviser’s fee is appropriate will not be disturbed.

Following the rejection of the Gartenberg Principles by the Seventh Circuit, the case progressed all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court where they affirmed the Gartenberg Principles as the standard upon which mutual fund boards should rely when considering the fees that a mutual fund pays to its investment adviser.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court provided precedent on economies of scale and the treatment of retail vs institutional mandates. The Court stated that because the 1940 Act requires consideration of all relevant factors, there can be no “categorical rule” on the comparison of fees charged to different clients, such as those charged by an adviser to its “captive” mutual fund and the fees it charges to its “independent clients”. The Supreme Court noted that there may be significant differences between the services provided by an investment adviser to a mutual fund and those it provides to a pension fund which are attributable to the greater frequency of shareholder redemptions in a mutual fund, the higher turnover of mutual fund assets, the more burdensome regulatory and legal obligations, and higher marketing costs

Jones was a strong affirmation of the Gartenberg principles and solidified it as the standard for determining investment advisers’ compliance with §36(b) in the United States.